Thursday was a big day for me. It challenged my views on Select Committees, which will be in my new book that will be published next week.
The Chairman of Parliament’s new Select Committee said he wanted conversational questions to witnesses. Graham Allen is largely responsible for the creation of the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee. I am its new member. My cross-examinations are usually brief and adversarial. I tried to adapt to the new atmosphere as the uncorrected minutes reveal. The experience was refreshing and exhilarating.
Q<164> <Paul Flynn:> There is a description of the creation of the British constitution as a process of evolutionary gradualism. The Occupy demonstrators, if they chant, don’t chant, “What do we want? Evolutionary gradualism. When do we want it? In a century’s time.” They are more likely to say, “What do we want? Revolution. When do we want it? Yesterday.” Don’t you feel that that extraordinary demonstration, which had echoes in 70 countries around the world—a tiny number of people who have provoked a world conversation on the processes of government—means that we are likely to see sudden changes in constitutions and the way we look at our problems?
<Professor Colley:> The constitutional history that used to be taught in this country—and no longer—was something like a confection. It made it seem more gradual than it often was. There have been revolutions in these islands. There have been very dramatic changes, like the treaty of Union of 1707 and the Act of Union with Ireland in 1800, which got rid of one Parliament and changed the nature and the composition of the Westminster Parliament. This was all glossed over under this slow, evolutionary model. But yes, there are all sorts of—not a crisis, but challenges and shifts. Perhaps one that we have not mentioned, which is important, is this. Up to the second world war, the British political elite was fairly homogenous. It was overwhelmingly white; it was overwhelmingly male. Most of these chaps went to certain schools, certain universities; they all studied the same kind of constitutional history. They all had, ideally—and often in fact—a common corpus of knowledge to work from. If you have that elite culture, then you can get away much more easily with things being unwritten—with a constitution of conventions—because there is a sense that we all know each other and we all know the unwritten rules.
Q<165> <Paul Flynn:> We are just about to go into a period where this institution—Parliament, the Lords—will become infantilised in an extraordinary way and behave in ways that most intelligent people would find ridiculous in our relationship to the Crown. We will behave as servile subjects, rather than intelligent, self-respecting citizens. Jamaica is the first of the Caribbean islands—and, probably, certainly not be the last—to say that it wishes to set up a republic. Where those constitutions that are based on ours take out this fundamental building block of the constitution—the Crown—how do you think that can happen? What model will they have to replace the Crown? What system do you think they should introduce, and is it possible to graft it on to those other countries that have their constitutions modelled on the British one?
<Professor Colley:> I am not remotely an expert on the Jamaican constitution. What I would say is that, in regard to written constitutions, historically they have sat comfortably with monarchies as well as with republics. These things can be done. One of the most successful, long-lived constitutions was the Swedish constitution, which was a written constitution created in the early 19th century by a monarchy, so the idea that these are all republican, revolutionary devices, historically, is not the case. But it would be interesting to see what happens in Jamaica and—perhaps even more, I suspect—what happens in Australia and New Zealand, both of which, I suspect, when there is a change of monarch, may well become republics.
<Dr Allison:> I am not au fait with the debates about Jamaica at all, or that development, but clearly it has been done elsewhere—having to introduce a President to fulfil some of the tasks of Her Majesty the Queen; on the other hand, the concept of the Crown, the concept of Government or the state—without too much difficulty. It has certainly been done before. It would not involve insurmountable difficulties. It would involve a change, but not a change that has not been encountered before.
Q<178> <Paul Flynn:> Can I follow up Stephen’s point about Churches? Is there not a lesson in what happened with the disestablishment of the Church in Wales, where F.E. Smith, as the leader of antidisestablishmentarianism, gave us not only the longest word in the English language, but a good lesson to follow? He said that the disestablishment of the Church in Wales is a Bill that will shock the conscience of every Christian community in Europe. There was hyperbole about in politics—we have not invented it in our generation—and as G.K. Chesterton said in a poem, talk about the Church and steeples, “And the cash that goes therewith: But the souls of Christian peoples… Chuck it, Smith.” Is there not a lesson in there? We have part of our constitution now, where the Prime Minister may not believe in God or be a Christian, but actually is responsible for appointing the head of the Church of England and the whole Anglican community. When there is an absurdity and an indefensible situation like that, public opinion will go along with it, and change and reforms are possible and probably popular.
<Professor Colley:> I think all things are possible with new initiatives. I come back to the point that it is probably wise not to overload the donkey and not to put too much in a new written text or texts, but it might be good to seize the opportunity to let certain things go that have survived from earlier times. That would have to be worked out. That would be what a constitutional convention would have to debate. The consensus to make the document has to be hammered out. It is not just the drafting; it is reaching sufficient agreement among a group of what should be largely elected people as to what they will wear, what they will accept and what is going to work. How those discussions would evolve, I do not know. It would be interesting and it would take a certain amount of time.
Q<179> <Paul Flynn:> Dr Allison, you made a point in one of your answers about the fragility of the monarchy in terms of personalities. There was a fascinating lecture given by Robert Rhodes James, who was a Member of this House and a serious historian. He said that when the skids were under Mrs Thatcher, there was great fear in the Conservative party that she was going to call a general election. The Conservative party, the Cabinet and Parliament could not have stopped her. The only person who could have stopped her was the monarch. Knowing the personality of the monarch, who has been involved with a whole series of Prime Ministers, very likely the monarch would have had the strength of character to ensure that a Prime Minister did not act in her own interests, but acted in the country’s interests. The difficulty there is that, almost certainly, successors of the present monarch, like her predecessors, will not have that strength of personality. Do you think there is a fundamental weakness there? We have depended on the Queen, who has been around for most of our lives, and there will be problems in future—in Australia, as you mentioned, but also elsewhere.
<Dr Allison:> Yes, there are certain limited functions that are fulfilled by the monarch, particularly in regard to the calling of elections in unusual circumstances: when an election is called for party political advantage, and when perhaps there is a national crisis or something happening where an election should not be held. The present monarch is obviously very experienced in dealing with her own advisers and would probably reach a very good decision, one could say, but that would not necessarily be assured in the future. The classic argument would be to think of an alternative, in view of the fact that the situation might not be the same at some point in the future. I think that is purely logical.
There is no particular reason why the solution that is currently available is going to be available in future for those limited functions. I do not want to use the word “crisis” too easily, but in the case of a hung Parliament and certain situations, the monarch could play a greater role. Someone sorted this out last time, but it would not necessarily always be the case, in which case the monarch might play a greater role than Her Majesty apparently played this time round. I am not quite sure what that role is. Part of the problem is that one does not really know what happens. If Her Majesty were to rely on her advisers, I am not quite sure what role they would play. That would also make me slightly concerned—what sort of advice was coming to Her Majesty.
<Professor Colley:> I think that conscientious and fully committed constitutional monarchs often find a written constitution helpful, so that they do not find themselves in an embarrassing, unclear situation where the initiative seems to be with them and they do not want it. There was a recent case in Luxembourg where the Grand Duke, who still technically has considerable powers, came to the legislature and said, “Technically, I have the power of veto over these laws. I do not want these powers. Make the change. I want it clear that this is nothing to do with me.” I think that having greater clarity might not be just convenient for citizens. It may also be useful and more comfortable for crowned heads. They know where they are.
Q<180> <Paul Flynn:> Professor Colley, you have referred to ill-digested constitutional change enacted by the previous Government. The devolution changes have come in piecemeal and painfully with LCOs and so on. It is a very untidy system, which seemed to indicate the reluctance of central power to release any power down the M4 or up to Scotland. I believe that the opposition to devolution in Wales was from people who said that it was a slippery slope. The support came from people who were also convinced that it was a slippery slope, because that is what they wanted: a slippery slope to independence. Perhaps you can tell us why you are critical of what the previous Government did and how we can do it in an improved way in the future to ensure a smooth run, if independence is going to come to Scotland and Wales.
<Professor Colley:> It is this kind of piecemeal tinkering tradition. Vernon Bogdanor has written about this far more learnedly than I am able to discuss it. There is always a temptation in a crowded parliamentary schedule, with the Executive never wishing to concede more power than it has to, to think of small piecemeal alterations, which can seem to be the easy way to do it or the only way to do it, but you do build more trouble. In this case, introducing devolution—which I favoured at the time, like so many others—without working out a federal structure at the same point and without having some kind of more comprehensive written text, while it seemed good at the time, was storing up issues, because devolution is not a one-off act. It was always going to be a developing phenomenon. Therefore, by not systematising it, you lost control, or any possibility of having any kind of control, of how this process was going to evolve. In fact, you did not save time. It was not the most convenient thing to do; it just seemed so at the time. That would be my instinct.
The Thatcher dilemma was an interesting one, the opposite has been happening in Canada in recent years and the Queen's Governor General there has been extremely helpful to the governing party in closing parliament to avoid votes of no confidence and the like.
That Canadians don't seem to get more upset by it surprises me, but perhaps the appearance of calm is more to do with their national temperament than with any great happiness about these events.
http://www.infowars.com/queen-dissolves-canadian-parliament-for-third-time-in-3-years/
Posted by: HuwOS | January 16, 2012 at 02:51 PM